Li Andersson, Interview by Albert Scharenberg
The Russian invasion of Ukraine impacted not only the states of Eastern Europe, but also the Scandinavian countries to a particular extent. This applies first and foremost to Finland, which had previously belonged to the Russian Empire and, after gaining its independence at the end of 1917, was attacked by the Soviet Union in 1939 as part of the so-called Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Today, the country shares a border of more than 1,300 kilometres with Russia. After decades of largely independent foreign and defence policies, Finland joined NATO in spring 2023.
At that time, Li Andersson was still Minister of Education in the cabinet led by Social Democrat Sanna Marin and leader of Vasemmistoliitto, the Left Alliance. After a right-wing government replaced the five-party coalition, she was elected to the European Parliament in the summer of 2024. During a recent visit to our headquarters in Berlin, the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation’s Albert Scharenberg spoke to her about the security and defence policy implications of Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine for Finland and Europe.
Since Russia launched its war of aggression against Ukraine, critics both in- and outside of the Left have argued that socialist parties should take security and defence policy more seriously. Do you agree with this assessment? What kind of rethinking has your own party, the Left Alliance, undertaken?
When the Russian invasion of Ukraine began, the Left Alliance was part of the Finnish government. We all want peace, but that invasion forced us to have challenging discussions and debates, because as a governing party, it is not enough to articulate general statements on the importance of peace. You really need to be able to take positions on the difficult issues concerning defence and security.
We were, however, somewhat prepared in terms of our policy lines. For example, the Left Alliance already was in favour of general conscription to the Finnish armed forces, so we did not need to rephrase our policies in this respect. But we did have to accept an increase in defence spending.
This was not an isolated position of the Finnish Left, however. The same decisions were made by other Nordic parties, because we were all confronted with the same situation: a neighbouring country waging a conventional war against another country in violation of international law. From our point of view, it is crucial that the Left very clearly condemns Russia’s war of aggression, and that the Left supports Ukraine, including with arms. The challenge for the Left is that Putin has forced us to think differently about issues of defence. It is not something we would have wanted, but we can no longer exclude the threat of war.
In response to the war and widespread fears of Russian aggression, both Finland and Sweden joined NATO. How did the Left Alliance come to terms with this new reality?
Indeed, the most challenging issue that came up in Finland after the Russian invasion was the question of NATO membership. For us, the actual issue was not that we were eager to join NATO, but that we needed security guarantees — I think this is an important difference to stress from a left-wing perspective. And it is exactly the same concern other countries in Eastern Europe have at the moment.
My party accepts Finnish NATO membership as a fact. That said, we focus on what we want Finland to do within NATO, such as campaigning against nuclear weapons, and ensuring that NATO prioritizes defence, instead of engaging in operations outside of NATO territory.
How can we decrease European dependency on the US? I think this should be a unifying issue for the Left.
Nevertheless, NATO membership did not turn Finland’s traditional foreign and security policy upside down. Before we joined NATO, Finland was militarily non-aligned, but as EU members, we did not call ourselves neutral. Unfortunately, Putin has made this option less credible in terms of defence and security policies, since we now have seen Russia invade a sovereign country that was outside of this kind of security architecture.
I think one of the biggest mistakes we made as a left party was that we did not take the initiative to create and develop an alternative European security architecture, including security guarantees. That could have constituted a real-life, concrete alternative to NATO membership that we could have put forward in the debates that arose in Sweden and Finland after the invasion of Ukraine.
I understand that this is a very hard debate. I have full respect for the fact that there are other positions within the European left, and I am fully aware of all the problems connected to NATO. But I think the biggest problem was that with respect to security guarantees, there were really no other options on the table. And I do think that the Left should be self-critical enough to say that we did not develop this kind of solution at an earlier stage, which actually would have been helpful as far as reducing the role of NATO is concerned.
Only two years after Finland and Sweden joined, NATO is led by none other than Donald Trump. What implications does this have for Europe?
The first thing that Trump will push for is a further increase in military spending. I do not think we will support this, or even putting any spending targets in place at all. Our position is that we do not want to lock in defence spending at a certain percentage of GDP such as two percent of GDP or even higher. Furthermore, I really think that setting such a target is a foolish way of measuring defence capabilities. Defence spending should not be based on abstract targets, but on needs and priorities.
There have, for instance, been times when Finland needed to, let’s say, renew our air force and buy new airplanes. In such a situation, defence spending goes up. After the investment is made, however, it can and should drop — even below the NATO target of two percent.
More generally, Finland already spent quite a bit on defence before joining NATO. This was a consequence of us not being in NATO. It is very simple: Without a military alliance, you have to be ready to spend enough to put up a credible defence on your own.
In view of Trump’s approach to international diplomacy, does Europe need a more independent security policy? And if so, what needs to be done to get there?
First and foremost, we think that at this moment, a central aim of our security and foreign policy should be to reduce dependencies on the US. This comes back to the options we were lacking when Russia invaded Ukraine. Thus, we need an increased role for European cooperation in the field of security policies and defence. This includes a strengthening of Europe within NATO.
I think that the incredibly weak response of the European Union countries to the genocide in Gaza will deepen the divide between the Global South and the Global North.
That’s why we also need a discussion in the EU regarding our armaments industries. If you look at European defence spending, you will find that a lot of the money is spent on buying American weapons. But do we really want to finance the US military-industrial complex? We think it is better to use our money for more European cooperation.
The big takeaway for Europe as far as Trump is concerned is that we need to be ready to stand on our own feet. We cannot fall back on the US, and we should not want to. But if we say we want to reduce European dependency on the US, some countries will probably need to spend a bit more on defence compared to what they spent before.
Would you argue that the European goal should be to acquire some kind of “strategic autonomy” from the US?
Yes, this is a useful concept for the Left because it connects to this time and this moment. How can we decrease European dependency on the US? I think this should be a unifying issue for the Left.
It also contains an industrial policy dimension beyond the defence industry. A lot of policies being discussed right now are more or less in line with how the Left generally thinks about public investment in our industries. The need not to be dependent on US or Chinese technology monopolies, and to develop those industries within Europe — the need for an energy transition of our industries, for instance.
At the same time, we know that a world that is less interdependent also poses new risks. I think the Left should be able to communicate that. I do not think we should cut all ties in terms of trade or commerce, or wage a Trumpist policy of high tariffs and protectionism — that’s not really a progressive alternative, either. Thinking in terms of strategic autonomy could be good for Europe from a leftist point of view, but we should not interpret this as a kind of isolationist policy like those we can now see being implemented, especially by the xenophobic far right.
Concerning the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Europe has been very outspoken and also quite supportive of the country under attack. With respect to Gaza, the story is quite different. While the Gaza war has been widely condemned in the Global South, the European Union and its member states have mostly been fairly quiet about it. In your opinion, do the European countries need to voice stronger opposition to Israel’s warfare?
I absolutely think so. The actions of the so-called Western countries, including the large majority of EU member states, will have a devastating effect on multilateral institutions and the role of international law. Their double standards are so blatant and flagrant. Comparing Ukraine and Gaza makes it all the clearer. There are EU countries that signal they will not implement the arrest orders from the International Criminal Court (ICC) when it comes to Israeli leaders, but who at the same time have been demanding that the Global South should support us when it comes to arresting Putin. Even though the same court issued both arrest orders! That kind of hypocrisy is just astounding.
We are approaching a breaking point in terms of global politics, and the erosion, or rather destruction of international rules-based institutions is one of the most dangerous developments. That is what leaders like Putin and Trump want: to end up in a world where countries pick and choose when they want to comply with international law and when not. That is exactly the kind of global order they are trying to shape. Of course, this is bad news for forces working for peace, international cooperation and understanding, and a rules-based order. It shows how strangely this world has developed and how strong the far right has become.
I think that the incredibly weak response of the European Union countries to the genocide in Gaza will deepen the divide between the Global South and the Global North. This is a very important issue for the Left — we should strive to bridge that gap. We need to show actors in both the North and South that there are still forces, movements, and parties that agree and are willing and ready to work together to defend institutions of international law and human rights.
Lately, there’s been a lot of talk about a ceasefire in Ukraine. What do you think should be the demands of the Left in this context?
I think the Left needs to understand that if there is a ceasefire — and after that, hopefully some kind of more lasting negotiation regarding Ukraine’s future — one part of that will have to do with the question of what security architecture Ukraine will be a part of. It should be clear that Ukraine cannot be left out in the cold.
My opinion is that EU membership would be the smartest solution for Ukraine and should be the priority. It is easier than NATO membership — which the new US administration has ruled out anyway. Ukrainian EU membership, on the other hand, would make them a part of the European security architecture. As it stands now, there are certain political guarantees, although they are, from a defence point of view, not as strong as NATO membership.
Too many observers are only interested in military issues, and not in the domestic issues that are of huge importance to the Ukrainians themselves — and these issues are linked to the question of social justice within Ukraine.
I think the European Left should position itself in favour of Ukrainian EU membership after this war. We should still demand that they fulfil the formal requirements. That will not be easy — they will need a lot of support to reform their own administration and society to fulfil the criteria. But this will also represent a huge change for the EU in terms of decision-making about the allocation of resources within the Union. It is a big question for the future of the EU, as well as for the people of Europe more generally. We need people to understand why it is important and get them on board.
Additionally, if there is a ceasefire, there will be a need for a peacekeeping mission in Ukraine. There will have to be foreign soldiers on the territory of Ukraine to uphold the ceasefire. The new US Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, has already declared that US soldiers will not be part of a peacekeeping mission in Ukraine and pushed that responsibility onto Europe. That leads to the question whether a European presence is enough to keep the ceasefire. I personally think Europe should be enough.
Should the Left also focus on what is going on within Ukraine? And shouldn’t we criticise the West’s plundering of Ukrainian resources, like the rare earth deal Trump recently demanded?
Definitely. The Left should denounce such horrible “deals”, or rather extortions, and focus on Ukrainian society.
Since the war began, we have called for a cancellation of Ukrainian state debt. This is a crucial issue because otherwise, the Ukrainians will end up in complete dependency on foreign lenders. That is not autonomy or independence. Thus, I think we should continue campaigning around this issue and work together with Ukrainian civil society, the trade unions, and progressive movements on issues like control of natural resources, workers’ rights, and so on.
Right now, there is a big debate in Ukraine around the country’s labour laws. To my understanding, the government is trying to make permanent some of the changes in labour law that were implemented under martial law. That would significantly weaken workers’ rights as well as the role of trade unions. This is exactly the kind of issue we should politicize. We should cooperate with the Ukrainian Left, and support them in the work they do in their society for the same kind of ideals and the same general political aims that we all share.
Another example is the huge housing crisis in Ukraine. Why is nobody discussing these issues within the EU? Too many observers are only interested in military issues, and not in the domestic issues that are of huge importance to the Ukrainians themselves — and these issues are linked to the question of social justice within Ukraine. That’s what we should focus on.
In closing, what would you, as a Member of the European Parliament, say should be the primary goal for Europe in the current political conjuncture?
I think a lot of citizens actually want Europe to step up in this geopolitical situation. They expect us to build an alternative to this authoritarian, fascist, violent rule that’s spreading across the globe. There is a need for voices who have a different analysis of the role we want to play — strong voices for international law, human rights, for a real solution to the climate crisis, which has a much broader impact on our security and safety than military defence.
That, however, requires a willingness to fight against these tech monopolies and the richest people in the world who are very openly seeking to transform their economic power into political power. Will Europe do that? The biggest fight we are going to have in the European Parliament in the coming years is against the far right. Which side will win and define what position the EU takes in this new geopolitical landscape? That is going to be the decisive battle.