Ukraine’s Kyiv leadership crisis: left voices on the reshuffle
The political crisis triggered by President Zelenskyy’s dismissal of Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov on 15 July 2026 has dominated international coverage, but the terms of the debate inside Ukraine are more complex than they appear. The protest movement demanding Fedorov’s reinstatement has been driven primarily by liberal and NGO circles, with the far right also attempting to hegemonise it — notably through calls for Azov commander Andrii Biletskyy as the replacement for army Commander-in-Chief Syrskyi. The anticapitalist left was already on the streets before Fedorov was dismissed: Sotsialnyi Rukh (Social Movement) and allied organisations had organised a protest against a near-fourfold rise in Kyiv public transport fares on July 14, and Vitaliy Dudin led the civic hearing that forced the issue onto the agenda. Dudin’s statement on the government reshuffle insists that the personnel debate obscures the structural question — what kind of state Ukraine is becoming under wartime pressure, and in whose interest. [AN]
A major political crisis
Thousands of people have demonstrated in Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities following the dismissal of Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The Guardian has described it as one of the largest political crises since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. [1]
Protesters have demanded that Zelenskyy reverse the decision, while also calling for the resignation of army Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi, who had been in long-running conflict with the defence minister. A far-right current was visible within the protests from the second day, with placards naming Azov commander Andrii Biletskyy as the preferred replacement for Syrskyi. [2]
Zelenskyy dismissed Fedorov on 15 July 2026 as part of a broader cabinet reshuffle forming the Koretskyi Government. The dismissal triggered daily protests in Kyiv and more than a dozen other cities, described by participants and organisers as the largest war-related demonstrations since the full-scale invasion. [3] On Tuesday 22 July, Zelenskyy announced that General Syrskyi would be replaced by General Mykhailo Drapatyi. [4] At the same time, he announced that the dismissed defence minister had been offered “a prominent position in the government” focused on Ukraine’s technological sector.
Fedorov has stated, however, that he will only return as defence minister, according to The Kyiv Independent, which reports that protests are continuing.
Too popular
Fedorov earned recognition for modernising Ukraine’s defence establishment. He came from the role of Minister of Digital Transformation, in which he oversaw the development of the government digital services platform Diia, [5] and became particularly known for his emphasis on drone technology during his six months as defence minister from January 2026.
During that period he drove competitive tendering through a procurement system long criticised for corruption, secured partner-nation access to a captured-weapons database to accelerate countermeasures, and negotiated restrictions on Russian military use of Starlink terminals supplied by SpaceX.
— Fedorov was becoming too popular for Zelenskyy. He had to remove the minister to avoid being politically overshadowed, says Oleksandr Kraiev, analyst at the Kyiv-based think tank Ukrainian Prism, [6] speaking to Klassekampen by phone.
‘A neoliberal technocrat’
Assessments of Fedorov are considerably more critical on the Ukrainian left. Two days before Fedorov’s dismissal, activists from Sotsialnyi Rukh, the Pryama Diya (Direct Action) [7] student union and the Pasyazhery Kyiva civic group had already been outside Kyiv’s city hall protesting a near-fourfold rise in public transport fares — a mobilisation in which Dudin himself led the civic hearing. [8]
“I don’t see how Fedorov could be reinstalled as minister,” writes Vitaliy Dudin from the Ukrainian left organisation Sotsialnyi Rukh (Social Movement) [9] in a message to Klassekampen.
He says the “tech-friendly” minister governed with a vision of a digital state built on deregulation and outsourcing.
“Fedorov has pursued a neoliberal policy that weakens workers’ rights and democratic oversight,” Dudin continues.
He argues Fedorov operated according to a “Silicon Valley-inspired model” in which “entrepreneurship is placed above social responsibility.”
“The defence sector must serve society, not private monopolies. Innovation should strengthen public capacity, decent working conditions, and democratic accountability — not enrich a new generation of oligarchs or foreign investors,” Dudin states.
He maintains that technological modernisation must not become “yet another pretext for neoliberal restructuring of the state.”
Against idealisation
Another voice critical of Fedorov as defence minister is the left-wing soldier Taras Bilous. [10]
“I don’t like the wave of idealisation of Fedorov,” Bilous writes on Facebook.
Bilous shares Dudin’s view that the Ministry of Defence under Fedorov did not adequately protect workers’ rights.
“He was better than the two previous defence ministers. But we must remember that Fedorov introduced an unjust system when it came to the dismissal of soldiers,” he notes.
Supporting the general’s removal
On the question of Syrskyi’s removal, Bilous supports the outgoing commander’s departure. Like the protesters, he considers that Syrskyi did not lead the army well enough.
“Syrskyi should have been removed long ago,” Bilous writes in a message to Klassekampen.
He argues that violence against soldiers within Ukraine’s armed forces increased under Syrskyi’s command.
“He micromanaged the front lines, and his decisions led to unnecessarily high losses among Ukrainian soldiers. We need a different commander-in-chief who knows how to wage war with limited personnel,” Bilous writes.
“The appointment of Mykhailo Drapatyi as the new commander-in-chief of the army is one of the best choices in that regard,” he adds. [11]
Overlooking a deeper question
Vitaliy Dudin of Sotsialnyi Rukh argues that the debate over the cabinet reshuffle has been reduced to a question of personalities.
“It has become a debate about whether Mykhailo Fedorov was an effective minister, whether he acquired too much influence, or whether President Zelenskyy is trying to remove potential rivals,” he writes in a message to Klassekampen.
“These questions may be politically relevant. But they overlook the deeper question. The real question is what kind of state Ukraine is becoming under the pressure of a prolonged war,” Dudin underlines.
Johanne Oleah Hovland and Ewa Sapieżyńska
P.S. Published in Klassekampen (The Class Struggle), Oslo, Norway, July 2026. Klassekampen is the principal Norwegian daily newspaper of the left, with a print circulation of approximately 37,000 (2025). It is the third-largest Norwegian print newspaper by readership.
Footnotes [1] The Guardian (UK), multiple reports, July 2026. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com
[2] On the far-right presence in the protests, see: Adam Novak, “Ukraine: The Streets Are Asking Questions the Leaders Cannot Answer”, Europe Solidaire Sans Frontières, July 2026. Available at: https://europe-solidaire.org/spip.php?article79459
[3] Euromaidan Press, “’Cardboard’ protests against Zelenskyy’s firing of Fedorov erupt across Ukraine”, 16 July 2026. Available at: https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/07/16/
[4] Reuters, “Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi named new commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian armed forces”, 22 July 2026. Available at: https://www.reuters.com
[5] Diia (Ukrainian: Дія, “Action”) is a state digital services application launched in 2020 that allows Ukrainian citizens to access government documents and services via smartphone. Fedorov served as minister responsible for digital transformation from 2019 to 2025.
[6] Ukrainian Prism is a Kyiv-based foreign policy think tank founded in 2016. It conducts research and analysis on Ukrainian foreign policy, security, and international relations.
[7] Pryama Diya (Ukrainian: Пряма Дія, Direct Action) is a Ukrainian left-wing student union.
[8] On the Kyiv transport fare campaign, see: Olena Tkalich, “Kyiv’s public advisory council demands reversal of wartime fare hike”, Europe Solidaire Sans Frontières, July 2026. Available at: https://europe-solidaire.org/spip.php?article79426
[9] Sotsialnyi Rukh (Соціальний рух, Social Movement) is a Ukrainian democratic socialist organisation founded in 2015, standing on the principles of democratic socialism and opposition to capitalism. It has consistently supported Ukrainian resistance to Russian aggression while critiquing the neoliberal orientation of the Zelenskyy governments. Website: https://rev.org.ua — See also: Vitaliy Dudin, “The dismissal of Fedorov is not the main issue. The future of Ukraine is”, Europe Solidaire Sans Frontières, 18 July 2026. Available at: https://europe-solidaire.org/spip.php?article79453
[10] Taras Bilous is a Ukrainian historian, editor of the left intellectual journal Spilne / Commons: Journal of Social Criticism, and an activist of Sotsialnyi Rukh (Social Movement). He has been serving in Ukraine’s armed forces since 2022. His “Letter to the Western Left from Kyiv” (openDemocracy, 2022) became a widely circulated statement on the Ukraine question within the international left. See also: “Ukraine: a socialist soldier on military bureaucracy, morale, and class consciousness at the front”, Europe Solidaire Sans Frontières, July 2026. Available at: https://europe-solidaire.org/spip.php?article79388
[11] Mykhailo Drapatyi (born 1982) is a Ukrainian major general with over two decades of combat experience, widely described as representative of a younger, post-Soviet generation of commanders. He first gained national prominence in 2014 during operations in Mariupol. He served as commander of the Ukrainian Ground Forces from 2024 to 2025, resigning after a Russian missile strike on a training ground killed Ukrainian soldiers. He subsequently commanded the Joint Forces until his appointment as Commander-in-Chief on 22 July 2026.